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Abstract—Machine learning (ML) over distributed multi-
party data is required for a variety of domains. Existing
approaches, such as federated learning, collect the outputs
computed by a group of devices at a central aggregator
and run iterative algorithms to train a globally shared
model. Unfortunately, such approaches are susceptible to a
variety of attacks, including model poisoning, which is made
substantially worse in the presence of sybils.
In this paper we first evaluate the vulnerability of
federated learning to sybil-based poisoning attacks. We then
describe FoolsGold, a novel defense to this problem that
identifies poisoning sybils based on the diversity of client
updates in the distributed learning process. Unlike prior
work, our system does not bound the expected number of
attackers, requires no auxiliary information outside of the
learning process, and makes fewer assumptions about clients
and their data.
In our evaluation we show that FoolsGold exceeds the ca-
pabilities of existing state of the art approaches to countering
sybil-based label-flipping and backdoor poisoning attacks.
Our results hold for different distributions of client data,
varying poisoning targets, and various sybil strategies.
1. Introduction
To train multi-party machine learning (ML) models
from user-generated data, users must provide and share
their training data, which can be expensive or privacy-
violating. Federated learning [26], [27] is a recent so-
lution to both problems: while training across mobile
devices, data is kept on the client device and only model
parameters are transferred to a central aggregator. This
allows clients to compute their model updates locally and
independently, while maintaining a basic level of privacy.
However, federated learning introduces a risky design
tradeoff: clients, who previously acted only as passive data
providers, can now observe intermediate model state and
contribute arbitrary updates as part of the decentralized
training process. This creates an opportunity for malicious
clients to manipulate the training process with little re-
striction. In particular, adversaries posing as honest clients
can send erroneous updates that maliciously influence the
properties of the trained model, a process that is known
as model poisoning.
Poisoning attacks have been well explored in cen-
tralized settings and two prevalent examples are label-
flipping attacks [9], [23] and backdoor attacks [4], [14],
[20]. In both types of attacks, the larger the proportion of
poisoning data, the higher the attack effectiveness. In a
TABLE 1. THE ACCURACY AND ATTACK SUCCESS RATES FOR
BASELINE (NO ATTACK), AND ATTACKS WITH 1 AND 2 SYBILS IN A
FEDERATED LEARNING CONTEXT WITH MNIST DATASET.
Baseline Attack 1 Attack 2
# honest clients 10 10 10
# malicious sybils 0 1 2
Accuracy (digits: 0, 2-9) 90.2% 89.4% 88.8%
Accuracy (digit: 1) 96.5% 60.7% 0.0%
Attack success rate 0.0% 35.9% 96.2%
federated learning context, where each client maintains
data locally, an adversary can naturally increase their
attack effectiveness by using sybils [17].
A federated learning poisoning experiment. We illus-
trate the vulnerability of federated learning to sybil-based
poisoning with three experiments based on the setup in
Figure 1 and show the results in Table 1. First, we recreate
the baseline evaluation in the original federated learning
paper [26] and train an MNIST [24] digit classifier across
non-IID data sources (Figure 1(a) and Baseline column in
Table 1). We train a softmax classifier across ten honest
clients, each holding a single digit partition of the original
ten-digit MNIST dataset. Each model is trained for 3000
synchronous iterations, in which each client performs a
local SGD update using a batch of 50 randomly sampled
training examples.
We then re-run the baseline evaluation with a label-
flipping 1-7 poisoning attack [7]: each malicious client
in the system has a poisoned dataset of 1s labeled as 7s
(Figure 1(b)). A successful attack generates a model that
is unable to correctly classify 1s and incorrectly predicts
them to be 7s. We define the attack success rate as the
proportion of 1s predicted to be 7s by the final model in
the test set. We perform two experiments, in which 1 or
2 malicious sybil clients attack the shared model (Attack
1 and Attack 2 in Table 1).
Table 1 shows that with only 2 sybils, 96.2% of 1s are
predicted as 7s in the final shared model. Since one honest
client held the data for digit 1, and two malicious sybils
held the poisoned 1-7 data, the malicious sybils were twice
as influential on the shared model as the honest client.
This attack illustrates a problem with federated learning:
all clients have equal influence on the system1. As a result,
regardless of the number of honest clients in a federated
learning system, with enough sybils an adversary may
1. The only weight in federated learning is the number of examples
that each client possesses, but this weight is easy for adversaries to inflate
by generating more data or by cloning their dataset.
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Figure 1. Federated learning with and without colluding sybils mounting a sybil-based poisoning attack. In the attack (b) two sybils poison the model
by computing over images of 1s with the (incorrect) class label 7.
overpower these honest clients and succeed in poisoning
the model.
Known defenses to poisoning attacks in a central-
ized context, such as robust losses [21] and anomaly
detection [35], assume control of the clients or explicit
observation of the training data. Neither of these assump-
tions apply to federated learning in which the server only
observes model parameters sent as part of the iterative
ML algorithm. Therefore, these defenses cannot be used
in federated learning.
Poisoning defenses that do apply to federated learn-
ing require explicit bounds on the expected number of
sybils [10], [36]. To the best of our knowledge, we are
the first to mitigate sybil-based poisoning attacks without
an explicit parameter for the number of attackers.
Since the federated learning server is unable to view
client training data and does not have a validation dataset,
the server cannot easily verify which client parameter
updates are genuine. Furthermore, these updates are a
product of a random stochastic process and will exhibit
high variance. We propose FoolsGold: a new defense
against federated learning sybil attacks that adapts the
learning rate of clients based on contribution similarity.
The insight in this work is that when a shared model is
manipulated by a group of sybils, they will, in expectation
over the entire training process, contribute updates towards
a specific malicious objective, exhibiting behavior that is
more similar than expected.
FoolsGold defends federated learning from attacks
performed by an arbitrary number of sybils with mini-
mal change to the original federated learning procedure.
Moreover, FoolsGold does not assume a specific number
of attackers. We evaluate FoolsGold on 4 diverse data
sets (MNIST [24], VGGFace2 [13], KDDCup99 [16],
Amazon Reviews [16]) and 3 model types (1-layer Soft-
max, Squeezenet, VGGNet) and find that our approach
mitigates label-flipping and backdoor attacks under a va-
riety of conditions, including different distributions of
client data, varying poisoning targets, and various sybil
strategies.
In summary, we make the following contributions:
? We consider sybil attacks on federated learning ar-
chitectures and show that existing defenses against
malicious adversaries in ML (Multi-Krum [10] and
RONI [6] (shown in Appendix B)) are inadequate.
? We design, implement, and evaluate a novel defense
against sybil-based poisoning attacks for the feder-
ated learning setting that uses an adaptive learning
rate per client based on inter-client contribution sim-
ilarity.
? In this context, we discuss optimal and intelligent at-
tacks that adversaries can perform, while suggesting
possible directions for further mitigation.
2. Background
Machine Learning (ML). Many ML problems can be
represented as the minimization of a loss function in a
large Euclidean space. For an ML binary classification
task that predicts a discrete binary output; more prediction
errors result in a higher loss. Given a set of training data
and a proposed model, ML algorithms train, or find an
optimal set of parameters, for the given training set.
Stochastic gradient descent (SGD). One approach in
ML is to use stochastic gradient descent (SGD) [12], an
iterative algorithm that selects a batch of training exam-
ples, uses them to compute gradients on the parameters
of the current model, and takes gradient steps in the
direction that minimizes the loss function. The algorithm
then updates the model parameters and another iteration
is performed. SGD is a general learning algorithm that
can be used to train a variety of models, including deep
learning models [12]. We assume SGD as the optimization
algorithm in this paper.
In SGD, the model parameters w are updated at each
iteration t as follows:
wt+1 = wt − ηt(λwt + 1
b
∑
(xi,yi)∈Bt
∇l(wt, xi, yi)) (1)
where ηt represents a local learning rate, λ is a regular-
ization parameter that prevents over-fitting, Bt represents
a gradient batch of training data examples (xi, yi) of size
b and ∇l represents the gradient of the loss function.
Batch size is what separates SGD from its counterpart,
gradient descent (GD). In GD, the entire dataset is used
to compute the gradient direction, but in SGD, a subset
is used at each iteration. This subset may be selected
in a pre-determined order or sampled randomly, but the
overall effect of SGD is that the gradient directions seen
over time vary (and have higher variance as the batch
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size b decreases). In practice, SGD is preferred to GD for
several reasons: it is less expensive for large datasets and
theoretically scales to datasets of infinite size.
A typical heuristic involves running SGD for a fixed
number of iterations or halting when the magnitude of the
gradient falls below a threshold. When this occurs, model
training is completed and the parameters wt are returned
as the optimal model w∗.
Federated learning [26]. In FoolsGold, we assume a
standard federated learning context, in which data is
distributed across multiple data owners and cannot be
shared. The distributed learning process is performed in
synchronous update rounds over a set of clients, in which
a weighted average of the k client updates, based on their
proportional training set size nk out of n total examples,
is applied to the model atomically.
wg,t+1 = wg,t +
∑
k
nk
n
∆k,t
Even if the training data is distributed such that it is not
independent and identically distributed (non-IID), feder-
ated learning can still attain convergence. For example,
federated learning can train an MNIST [24] digit recog-
nition classifier in a setting where each client only held
data for 1 of the digit classes (0-9), as in Figure 1(a).
Federated learning comes in two forms: FEDSGD, in
which each client sends every SGD update to the server,
and FEDAVG, in which clients locally batch multiple
iterations of SGD before sending updates to the server,
which is more communication efficient. We show that
FoolsGold can be applied successfully on both algorithms.
Federated learning also enables model training across
a set of clients with highly private data. For example,
differentially private [18] and securely aggregated [11]
additions have been released, yet the use of federated
learning in multi-party settings still presents new privacy
and security vulnerabilities [4], [22], [32]. In this paper
we design FoolsGold to address sybil-based poisoning
attacks.
Targeted poisoning attacks on ML. In a targeted poi-
soning attack [7], [28], an adversary meticulously cre-
ates poisoned training examples and inserts them into
the training data set of an attacked model. This is done
to increase/decrease the probability of the trained model
predicting a targeted example as a targeted class [23]
(see Figure 1(b)). For example, such an attack could be
mounted to avoid fraud detection or to evade email spam
filtering [30].
In FoolsGold, we consider targeted attacks of two
types. In label-flipping attacks [9], the labels of honest
training examples of one class are flipped to another class
while the features of the data are kept unchanged. In
backdoor attacks [4], [20], single features or small regions
of the original training data are augmented with a secret
pattern and relabeled. The pattern acts as a trigger for the
target class, which is exploited by an attacker. Generally,
it is important for a poisoning attack to not significantly
change the prediction outcomes of other classes. Other-
wise, the attack will be detected by users of the shared
model.
In federated learning, the aggregator does not see any
training data, and we therefore view poisoning attacks
from the perspective of model updates: a subset of updates
Poisoner objective
True objectiveRd
Attack
target
Feature space
Figure 2. Targeted poisoning attack in SGD. The dotted red vectors are
sybil contributions that drive the model towards a poisoner objective. The
solid green vectors are contributed by honest clients that drive towards
the true objective.
sent to the model at any given iteration are poisoned [10].
This is functionally identical to a centralized poisoning
attack in which a subset of the total training data is
poisoned. Figure 2 illustrates a targeted poisoning attack
in a federated learning context.
Sybil attacks. A system that allows clients to join and
leave is susceptible to sybil attacks [17], in which an ad-
versary gains influence by joining a system under multiple
colluding aliases. In FoolsGold, we assume that adver-
saries leverage sybils to mount more powerful poisoning
attacks on federated learning.
3. Assumptions and threat model
Setting assumptions. We are focused on federated learn-
ing and therefore assume that data is distributed and
hidden across clients. The adversary can only access and
influence ML training state through the federated learning
API, and adversaries cannot observe the training data of
other honest clients.
This means that by observing the total change in model
state, adversaries can observe the total averaged gradient
across all clients, but they cannot view the gradient of any
individual honest client.
On the server side of the algorithm, we assume that
the aggregator is uncompromised and is not malicious.
Similarly, we assume that some number of honest clients,
who possess training data which opposes the attacker’s
poisoning goal, participate in the system. More precisely,
our solution requires that every class defined by the model
is represented in the data of at least one honest client.
Without these honest clients, no contribution-based de-
fense is possible since the model would be unable to learn
anything about these classes in the first place.
Secure-aggregation for federated learning provides
better privacy by obfuscating individual client up-
dates [11]. We assume that these types of obfuscations
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are not used, and that the central server is able to observe
any individual client’s model update at each iteration.
Poisoning attacks. In our setting, targeted poisoning at-
tacks are performed by adversaries against the globally
trained model. An adversary has a defined poisoning goal:
increase the probability of one class being classified as a
different, incorrect class without influencing the output
probabilities of any other class. To minimize the possibil-
ity of the poisoning attack being detected, the prediction
outcomes of classes auxiliary to the attack should be
minimally changed.
We assume that poisoning attacks are performed using
either the label-flipping strategy [9], in which the labels of
honest training examples are flipped to a target class, or
the backdoor strategy [4], [20], in which unused features
are augmented with secret patterns and exploited.
Since the range of possible SGD updates from an
adversary is unbounded, another possible attack involves
scaling malicious updates to overpower honest clients.
However, state of the art magnitude-based detection meth-
ods exist [10] to prevent these attacks, and therefore we
do not consider these attacks.
Sybils perform poisoning attacks on federated learning
by providing updates that direct the shared model towards
a common poisoned objective, as shown in Figure 2.
We do not constrain how a sybil selects these poisoned
updates: they can be sourced from poisoned data [7] or
computed through other methods.
Attacker capability. For a poisoning attack to succeed in
a deployment with many honest clients, an attacker must
exert more influence on their target class than the total
honest influence on this class. This is already a problem
for classes that are not well represented in the training
data, but in federated learning, where each client is given
an equal share of the aggregated gradient, attackers can
attack any class with enough influence by generating
additional sybils.
If a third party account verification process exists in
the system, we assume that the adversary has the means
to bypass it, either by creating malicious accounts or by
compromising honest clients/accounts.
Sybils observe global model state and send any arbi-
trary gradient contribution to aggregator at any iteration.
Sybils can collude by sharing state among themselves and
by sending updates in an intelligent, coordinated fashion.
Sybils controlled by multiple sets of non-colluding adver-
saries may perform poisoning attacks concurrently.
4. SGD Challenges and defenses
In the traditional federated learning setting, the fed-
erated learning service only has access to the outputs of
local SGD computations. From the aggregator’s perspec-
tive, detecting sybils from a stream of SGD iterations is
difficult. If GD, and not SGD, is used as the optimization
algorithm, then detection becomes easier: in this setting,
updates are deterministic functions of data and duplicate
updates are easy to detect. The challenge with SGD is
three-fold:
Challenge 1. Each client houses a local, unseen partition
of the data that independently may not satisfy the global
learning objective. When receiving a gradient from a
client, it is difficult for the aggregator to tell whether the
gradient points towards a malicious objective or not. We
assume that FoolsGold, the system we design, does not
possess a validation dataset.
Challenge 2. Since only a small subset of the original
dataset is used in each iteration, the stochastic objective
changes with each iteration. The aggregator cannot assume
that updates pointing in sporadic directions are malicious.
As well, the aggregator cannot assume that updates that
are similar came from similar underlying datasets.
Challenge 3. As the batch size b of updates decreases,
the variance of updates contributed by clients increases.
At any given iteration, sampling a smaller portion of the
dataset results in a higher variance of gradient values,
producing the sporadic behavior described above. Since
adversaries can send arbitrary updates to the model, we
cannot trust that they will conform to a specified batch
size configuration.
The challenges above make existing poisoning de-
fenses ineffective against sybil-based attacks on federated
learning, particularly in non-IID settings.
Multi-Krum [10] was specifically designed to counter
adversaries in federated learning. In Multi-Krum, the top
f contributions to the model that are furthest from the
mean client contribution are removed from the aggregated
gradient. Multi-Krum uses the Euclidean distance to deter-
mine which gradient contributions are removed, requires
parameterization of the number of expected adversaries,
and can theoretically only withstand sybil-based poisoning
attacks of up to 33% adversaries in the client pool.
We assume that attackers can spawn a large num-
ber of sybils, rendering assumptions about proportions
of honest clients unrealistic. As well, the mean in the
Multi-Krum process can be arbitrarily influenced by sybil
contributions. We compare FoolsGold against Multi-Krum
in Section 6.2.
5. FoolsGold design
Our solution is intended for a federated learning set-
ting where the service only has access to the outputs of
client SGD computations. We design a learning method
that does not make assumptions about the proportion of
honest clients in the system. Our learning method only
uses state from the learning process itself to adapt the
learning rates of clients.
Our key insight is that honest clients can be separated
from sybils by the diversity of their gradient updates. In
federated learning, since each client’s training data has
a unique distribution and is not shared, sybils share a
common objective and will contribute updates that ap-
pear more similar to each other than honest clients. This
property of federated learning is shown in Figure 6 and
explored in Section 6.3.
FoolsGold uses this assumption to modify the learning
rates of each client in each iteration. Our approach aims
to maintain the learning rate of clients that provide unique
gradient updates, while reducing the learning rate of
clients that repeatedly contribute similar-looking gradient
updates.
With this in mind, FoolsGold has five design goals:
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Figure 3. Dashed lines are gradient updates from three clients (2 sybils,
1 honest). Solid lines are aggregated update vectors. The angle between
the aggregated update vectors of sybil clients (θ) is smaller than between
those of the honest client and a sybil (γ). Cosine similarity would reflect
this similarity.
Goal 1. When the system is not attacked, FoolsGold
should preserve the performance of federated learning.
Goal 2. FoolsGold should devalue contributions from
clients that point in similar directions.
Goal 3. FoolsGold should be robust to an increasing
number of sybils in a poisoning attack.
Goal 4. FoolsGold should distinguish between honest up-
dates that mistakenly appear malicious due to the variance
of SGD and sybil updates that operate on a common
malicious objective.
Goal 5. FoolsGold should not rely on external assump-
tions about the clients or require parameterization about
the number of attackers.
We now explain the FoolsGold approach (Algo-
rithm 1). In the federated learning protocol, gradient up-
dates are collected and aggregated in synchronous update
rounds. FoolsGold adapts the learning rate αi per client2
based on (1) the update similarity among indicative fea-
tures in any given iteration, and (2) historical information
from past iterations.
Cosine similarity. We use cosine similarity to measure
the angular distance between updates. This is preferred
to Euclidean distance since sybils can manipulate the
magnitude of a gradient to achieve dissimilarity, but the
direction of a gradient cannot be manipulated without
reducing attack effectiveness. The magnitude of honest
updates is also affected by client-side hyper-parameters,
such as the local learning rate, which we do not control.
Feature importance. From the perspective of a potential
poisoning attack, there are three types of features in the
model: (1) features that are relevant to the correctness of
the model, but must be modified for a successful attack,
(2) features that are relevant to the correctness of the
2. Note that we use α for the FoolsGold assigned learning rate, and
η for the traditional, local learning rate. These are independent of each
other.
Data: Global Model wt and SGD update ∆i,t
from each client i at iteration t. Confidence
parameter κ
1 for Iteration t do
2 for All clients i do
// Updates history
3 Let Hi be the aggregate historical vector∑T
t=1 ∆i,t
// Feature importance
4 Let St be the weight of indicative features
at iteration t
5 for All other clients j do
6 Let csij be the St-weighted cosine
similarity between Hi and Hj
7 end
8 Let vi = maxj(csi)
9 end
10 for All clients i do
11 for All clients j do
// Pardoning
12 if vj > vi then
13 csij ∗= vi/vj
14 end
15 end
// Row-size maximums
16 Let αi = 1−maxj(csi)
17 end
// Logit function
18 αi = αi/maxi(α)
19 αi = κ(ln[(αi)/(1− αi)] + 0.5)
// Federated SGD iteration
20 wt+1 = wt +
∑
i αi∆i,t
21 end
Algorithm 1: FoolsGold algorithm.
model, but irrelevant for the attack, and (3) features that
are irrelevant to both the attack and the model.
Similar to other decentralized poisoning defenses [36],
we look for similarity only in the indicative features
(type 1 and 2) in the model. This prevents adversaries
from manipulating irrelevant features while performing an
attack, which is evaluated in Section 6.4.
The indicative features are found by measuring the
magnitude of model parameters in the output layer of the
global model. Since training data features and gradient
updates are normalized while performing SGD, the mag-
nitude of an output layer parameter maps directly to its
influence on the prediction probability [37]. These features
can be filtered (hard) or re-weighed (soft) based on their
influence on the model, and are normalized across all
classes to avoid biasing one class over another.
For deep neural networks, we do not consider the
magnitude of values in the non-output layers of the model,
which do not map directly to output probabilities and are
more difficult to reason about. Recent work on feature
influence in deep neural networks [1], [15] may better
capture the intent of sybil-based poisoning attacks in deep
learning and we leave this analysis as future work.
Updates history. FoolsGold maintains a history of up-
dates from each client. It does this by aggregating the
updates at each iteration from a single client into a single
aggregated client gradient (line 3). To better estimate
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similarity of the overall contributions made by clients,
FoolsGold computes the similarity between pairwise ag-
gregated historical updates instead of just the updates from
the current iteration.
Figure 3 shows that even for two sybils with a common
target objective, updates at a given iteration may diverge
due to the problems mentioned in Challenge 2. However,
the cosine similarity between the sybils’ aggregated his-
torical updates is high, satisfying Goal 2.
We interpret the cosine similarity on the indicative
features, a value between -1 and 1, as a representation of
how strongly two clients are acting as sybils. We define
vi as the maximum pairwise similarity for a client i,
ensuring that as long as one such interaction exists, we
can devalue the contribution while staying robust to an
increasing number of sybils, as prescribed by Goal 3.
csij = cosine similarity(
T∑
t=1
∆i,t,
T∑
t=1
∆j,t)
Pardoning. Since we have weak guarantees on the cosine
similarities between an honest client and sybils, honest
clients may be incorrectly penalized under this scheme.
We introduce a pardoning mechanism that avoids pe-
nalizing such honest clients by re-weighing the cosine
similarity by the ratio of vi and vj (line 13), satisfying
Goal 4. The new client learning rate αi is then found
by inverting the maximum similarity scores along the 0-
1 domain. Since we assume at least one client in the
system is honest, we rescale the vector such that the
maximum adaption of the learning rate is 1 (line 18). This
ensures that at least one client will have an unmodified
update and encourages the system towards Goal 1: a
system containing only honest nodes will not penalize
their contributions.
αi = 1−max
j
(csi)
αi =
αi
maxi(α)
Logit. However, even for very similar updates, the cosine
similarity may be less than one. An attacker may exploit
this by increasing the number of sybils to remain influen-
tial. We therefore want to encourage a higher divergence
for values that are near the two tails of this function,
and avoid penalizing honest clients with a low, non-zero
similarity value. Thus, we use the logit function (the
inverse sigmoid function) centered at 0.5 (line 19), for
these properties. We also expose a confidence parameter
κ that scales the logit function and show in 9 that κ can
be set as a function of the data distribution among clients
to guarantee convergence.
αi = κ(ln[
αi
1− αi ] + 0.5)
When taking the result of the logit function, any value
exceeding the 0-1 range is clipped and rounded to its
respective boundary value. Finally, the overall gradient up-
date is calculated by applying the final re-scaled learning
rate:
wt+1 = wt +
∑
i
αi∆i,t
TABLE 2. DATASETS USED IN THIS EVALUATION.
Dataset TrainSet Size Classes Features Model Used
MNIST 60,000 10 784 1-layer softmax
VGGFace2 7,380 10 150,528 SqueezeNet, VG-
GNet11
KDDCup 494,020 23 41 1-layer softmax
Amazon 1,500 50 10,000 1-layer softmax
Note that this design does not require parameterization
of the expected number of sybils or their properties (Goal
5), is independent of the underlying model, and is also
independent of SGD details such as the local client’s
learning rate or batch size.
Augmenting FoolsGold with other methods. Simply
modifying the learning rates of clients based on their
aggregate gradient similarity will not handle all poisoning
attacks. Clearly, an attack from a single adversary will
not exhibit such similarity. FoolsGold is best used when
augmented with existing solutions that detect poisoning
attacks from a bounded number of attackers. We evaluate
FoolsGold with Multi-Krum in Section 7.
Convergence properties. FoolsGold is analagous to im-
portance sampling [29] and adaptive learning rate meth-
ods [42], which have both been applied to SGD algorithms
and have convergence guarantees. We analyze FoolsGold’s
convergence guarantees in 9. Our experimental results
further support that FoolsGold converges under a variety
of conditions.
FoolsGold security guarantees. We claim that our design
mitigates an adversary performing a targeted poisoning
attack by limiting the influence they gain through sybils.
We also claim that FoolsGold satisfies the specified design
goals: it preserves the updates of honest nodes while pe-
nalizing the contributions of sybils. In the next section we
empirically validate these claims across several different
dimensions using a prototype of FoolsGold.
6. Evaluation
We evaluate FoolsGold by implementing a federated
learning prototype in 600 lines of Python. The proto-
type includes 150 lines for FoolsGold, implementing Al-
gorithm 1. We use scikit-learn [34] to compute cosine
similarity of vectors. For each experiment below, we par-
tition the original training data into disjoint non-IID train-
ing sets, locally compute SGD updates on each dataset,
and aggregate the updates using the described FoolsGold
method to train a globally shared classifier.
We evaluate our prototype on four well-known classi-
fication datasets: MNIST [24], a digit classification prob-
lem, VGGFace2 [13], a facial recognition problem, KD-
DCup [16], which contains classified network intrusion
patterns, and Amazon [16], which contains a corpus of
text from product reviews. Table 2 describes each dataset.
Each dataset was selected for one of its particularities.
MNIST was chosen as the baseline dataset for evaluation
since it was used extensively in the original federated
learning evaluation [26]. The VGGFace2 dataset was cho-
sen as a more complex learning task that required deep
neural networks to solve. For simplicity in evaluating
poisoning attacks, we limit this dataset to the top 10
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most frequent classes only. The KDDCup dataset has a
relatively low number of features, and contains a massive
class imbalance: some classes have as few as 5 examples,
while some have over 280,000. Lastly, the Amazon dataset
is unique in that it has few examples and contains text
data: each review is converted into its one hot encoding,
resulting in a large feature vector of size 10,000.
For all the experiments in this section, targeted poi-
soning attacks are performed that attempt to encourage
a source label to be classified as a target label while
training on a federated learning prototype. When dividing
the data, each class is always completely represented by
a single client, which is consistent with the federated
learning baseline. In all experiments the number of honest
clients in the system varies by dataset: 10 for MNIST and
VGGFace2, 23 for KDDCup, and 50 for Amazon. We
consider more IID settings in Section 6.3.
For MNIST, KDDCup, and Amazon, we train a single
layer fully-connected softmax for classification. The size
of the trained model in each case is the product of the
number of classes and number of features. For VGGFace2,
we use two popular architectures pre-trained on Ima-
genet from the torchvision package [25]: SqueezeNet1.1,
a smaller model designed for edge devices with 727,000
parameters; and VGGNet11, a larger model with 128
million parameters. When using FoolsGold to compare
client similarity, we only use the features in the final
output layer’s gradients (fully connected layer in VGGNet
and 10 1x1 convolutional kernels in SqueezeNet).
In MNIST, the data is already divided into 60,000
training examples and 10,000 test examples [24]. For
VGGFace2, KDDCup and Amazon, we randomly partition
30% of the total data to be test data. The test data is used
to evaluate two metrics that represent the performance of
our algorithm: the attack rate, which is the proportion
of attack targets (source labels for label flipping attacks
or embedded images for backdoor attacks) that are in-
correctly classified as the target label, and the accuracy,
which is the proportion of examples in the test set that
are correctly classified.
The MNIST and KDDCup datasets were executed with
3,000 iterations and a batch size of 50 unless otherwise
stated. For Amazon, due to the high number of features
and low number of samples per class, we train for 100
iterations and a batch size of 10. For VGGFace2, we
train for 500 iterations, using SGD with batch size of 8,
momentum 0.9, weight decay 0.0001, and learning rate
0.001. These values were found using cross validation in
the training set. During training, images were resized to
256x256 and randomly cropped and flipped to 224x224.
During testing, images were resized to 256x256 and a
224x224 center was cropped.
In each of the non-attack scenarios, we ran each ex-
periment to convergence. In all attack scenarios, we found
that our selected number of iterations was sufficiently high
such that the performance of the attack changed minimally
with each iteration, indicating the result of the attack to
be consistent. For each experiment, FoolsGold is param-
eterized with a confidence parameter κ = 1, and does
not use the historical gradient or the significant features
filter (we evaluate these design elements independently
in Section 6.5 and 6.4, respectively). Each reported data
point is the average of 5 experiments.
TABLE 3. CANONICAL ATTACKS USED IN OUR EVALUATION.
Attack Description Dataset
A-1 Single client attack. All
A-5 5 clients attack. All
A-5x5 5 sets of 5 clients, concurrent
attacks.
MNIST,
Amazon,
VGGFaces2
A-OnOne 5 clients executing 5 attacks on
the same target class.
KDDCup99
A-99 99% sybils, performing the
same attack.
MNIST
6.1. Canonical attack scenarios
Our evaluation uses a set of 5 attack scenarios (that we
term canonical for this evaluation) across the three datasets
(Table 3). Attack A-1 is a traditional poisoning attack:
a single client joins the federated learning system with
poisoned data. Attack A-5 is the same attack performed
with 5 sybil clients joining the system. Each client sends
updates for a subset of its data through SGD, meaning
that their updates are not identical. Attack A-2x5 evaluates
FoolsGold’s ability to thwart multiple attacks at once: 2
sets of client sybils attack the system concurrently, and
for attack evaluation purposes we assume that the classes
in these attacks do not overlap3.
Since KDDCup99 is a unique dataset with severe
class imbalance, instead of using an A-2x5 attack we
choose to perform a different attack, A-OnOne, on this
dataset. In KDDCup99, data from various network traffic
patterns are provided. Class “Normal” identifies patterns
without any network attack, and is proportionally large
(approximately 20% of the data) in the overall dataset.
Therefore, when attacking KDDCup99, we assume that
adversaries mis-label malicious attack patterns, which are
proportionally small, (approximately 2% of the data) and
poison the malicious class towards the “Normal” class.
A-AllOnOne is a unique attack for KDDCup in which 5
different malicious patterns are each labeled as “Normal”,
and each attack is performed concurrently.
Finally, we use A-99 to illustrate the robustness of
FoolsGold to massive attack scenarios. In this attack, an
adversary generates 990 sybils to overpower a network
of 10 honest clients and all of them attempt a single 1-7
attack against MNIST.
Since we use these canonical attacks throughout this
work, we first evaluate each attack on the respective
dataset (Table 3) with FoolsGold enabled. Figure 4 plots
the attack rate and test accuracy for each attack in Table 3.
The Figure also shows results for the system without
attacks: the original federated learning algorithm (FL-NA)
and the system with the FoolsGold algorithm (FG-NA).
Figure 4 shows that for most attacks, including the
A-OnOne attack and the A-99 attack, FoolsGold effec-
tively prevents the attack while maintaining high training
accuracy. As FoolsGold faces larger groups of sybils, it
has more information to more reliably detect similarity
between sybils. FoolsGold performs worst on the A-1
attacks in which only one malicious client attacked the
system. The reason is simple: without multiple colluding
3. We do not perform a 1-2 attack in parallel with a 2-3 attack, since
evaluating the 1-2 attack would be biased by the performance of the 2-3
attack.
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Figure 4. Training accuracy (blue bars) and attack rate (red ticks) for canonical attacks against the relevant canonical datasets.
sybils, malicious and honest clients are indistinguishable
to the FoolsGold aggregator.
Another point of interest is the prevalence of false pos-
itives. In A-1 KDDCup, our system incorrectly penalized
an honest client for colluding with the attacker, lowering
the prediction rate of the honest client as the defense was
applied. We observe that the two primary reasons for low
training error are either a high attack rate (false negatives)
or a high target class error rate (false positives). We also
discuss false positives from data similarity in Section 6.3.
6.2. Comparison to prior work
We compare FoolsGold to Multi-Krum aggrega-
tion [10], the known state of the art in defending against
Byzantine clients in distributed SGD (see Section 2).
Comparison to Multi-Krum. In this experiment we
compare FoolsGold to Multi-Krum and an unmodified
federated learning baseline as we vary the number of
sybils.
We implemented Multi-Krum as specified in the orig-
inal paper [10]: at each iteration, the total Euclidean
distance from the n−f−2 nearest neighbors is calculated
for each update. The f updates with the highest distances
are removed and the average of the remaining updates
is calculated. Multi-Krum relies on the f parameter: the
maximum number of Byzantine clients tolerated by the
system. To defend against sybil attacks in this setting, we
set f to be the number of sybils executing a poisoning
attack. Although this is the best case for Multi-Krum, we
note that prior knowledge of f is an unrealistic assumption
when defending against sybils.
While running Multi-Krum, we found that the perfor-
mance was especially poor in the non-IID setting. When
the variance of updates among honest clients is high, and
the variance of updates among sybils is lower, Multi-
Krum removes honest clients from the system. This makes
Multi-Krum unsuitable for defending against sybils in
federated learning, which is intended for non-IID set-
tings [26].
Figure 5 shows the performance of the three ap-
proaches against an increasing number of poisoners: a 1-7
attack is performed on an unmodified non-IID federated
learning system (Baseline), a federated learning system
with Multi-Krum aggregation, and our proposed solution.
We show FoolsGold’s effectiveness against both FEDSGD
and FEDAVG [26], in which clients perform multiple local
iterations before sharing updates with the aggregator.
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Figure 5. Attack rate for varying number of sybils, for federated learning
(Baseline), Multi-Krum, and FoolsGold.
We see that as soon as the proportion of poisoners for
a single class increases beyond the corresponding number
of honest clients that hold that class (which is 1), the attack
rate increases significantly for naive averaging (Baseline).
In addition to exceeding the parameterized number of
expected sybils, an adversary can also influence the mean
client contribution at any given iteration, and Multi-Krum
will fail to distinguish between honest clients and sybils.
Multi-Krum works with up to 33% sybils [10], but
fails above this threshold. By contrast, FoolsGold penal-
izes attackers further as the proportion of sybils increases,
and in this scenario FoolsGold remains robust even with
9 attackers.
Consistent with the results in Figure 4, FoolsGold
in Figure 5 performs the worst when only one poisoner
is present. We also show that FoolsGold similarly out-
performs Multi-Krum in defending against backdoor at-
tacks [20] in Appendix B.
6.3. Varying client data distributions
FoolsGold relies on the assumption that training data
is sufficiently dissimilar between clients. However, a real-
istic scenario may involve settings where each client has
overlapping data, such as images of the same people.
To test FoolsGold under diverse data distribution as-
sumptions, we conduct an A-5 0-1 attack (with 5 sybils)
on MNIST and VGGFace2 with 10 honest clients while
varying the proportion of shared data within both the
sybils and honest clients. We varied the distribution of
sybils and honest clients over a grid (xsybil, xhonest ∈
{0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}), where x refers to the ratio of dis-
joint data to shared data. Specifically, a proportion of 0%
refers to a non-IID setting in which each client’s dataset
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Figure 6. A visualization of the historical gradient of clients in
Squeezenet, in the non-IID (left) and IID (right) case. The top 10 rows
show the gradient vector of honest clients; the bottom 5 rows for sybils
performing a targeted 0-1 attack.
is composed of a single class, and 100% refers to a setting
where each client’s dataset is uniformly sampled from all
classes. A proportion of x refers to a setting where clients
hold x% uniform data from all classes and (1 − x)%
disjoint data for a specific class. To create a sybil client
with x% shared data, we first create an honest client with
x% shared data and (1 − x)% disjoint data using class
0, and then flip all 0 labels to a 1 to perform a targeted
attack.
To understand how FoolsGold handles these situations,
we visualize the gradient history of all clients for a
VGGFaces2 A-5 experiment in Figure 6. Each row shows
the historical gradient of a client in the final classification
layer, where the top 10 rows correspond to honest clients
and the bottom 5 rows correspond to sybils. The left side
of Figure 6 shows the historical gradient in a non-IID
setting (xsybil, xhonest = 0). Since each honest client
has data corresponding to a unique class, their gradients
are highly dissimilar, and since the sybils have the same
poisoning dataset for a 0-1 attack, their gradients are
highly similar. Therefore, FoolsGold can easily detect the
sybil gradients.
The right side of Figure 6 shows the historical gradient
in an IID setting (xsybil, xhonest = 1). Even when the
honest clients all hold uniform samples of the training
data, the stochasticity of SGD introduces variance between
honest clients, and the sybil gradients are still uniquely
distinct as a result of their poisoned data, as seen in
the bottom left corners of Figure 6. Sybils that intend to
execute a targeted poisoning attack produce fundamentally
similar gradient updates, enabling FoolsGold to succeed.
We formally define the convergence of FoolsGold by
bounds on inter-client update similarity in Appendix A.
FoolsGold is effective at defending against poisoning
attacks for all combinations: the maximum attack rate was
less than 1% for both the MNIST and VGGFace2 datasets,
using both SqueezeNet and VGGNet. We show these
results in Figure 7. As the results in this section demon-
strate, a malicious actor cannot subvert FoolsGold by ma-
nipulating their malicious data distribution. Instead, they
must directly manipulate their gradient outputs, which we
explore next.
6.4. What if the attacker knows FoolsGold?
If an attacker is aware of the FoolsGold algorithm,
they may attempt to send updates in ways that encourage
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Figure 7. The attack rates on the MNIST and VGGFace2 dataset for
varying sybil and honest client data distributions. 0% means that the data
is completely disjoint by class; 100% means that the data is uniformly
distributed.
additional dissimilarity. This is an active trade-off: as
attacker updates become less similar to each other (lower
chance of detection), they become less focused towards
the poisoning objective (lower attack utility).
We consider and evaluate four ways in which attackers
may attempt to subvert FoolsGold: (1) mixing malicious
and correct data, (2) changing sybils’ training batch size,
(3) perturbing contributed updates with noise, and (4) in-
frequently and adaptively sending poisoned updates. Due
to space constraints, the results of (1) and (2) are listed
in Appendix B.
Adding intelligent noise to updates. A set of intelligent
sybils could send pairs of updates with carefully perturbed
noise that is designed to sum to zero. For example, if an
attacker draws a random noise vector ζ, two malicious
updates a1 and a2 could be contributed as v1 and v2,
such that: v1 = a1 + ζ, and v2 = a2 − ζ.
Since the noise vector ζ has nothing to do with the
poisoning objective, its inclusion will add dissimilarity to
the malicious updates and decrease FoolsGold’s effective-
ness in detecting them. Also note that the sum of these two
updates is still the same: v1 + v2 = a1 +a2. This strategy
can also be scaled beyond 2 sybils by taking orthogonal
noise vectors and their negation: for any subset of these
vectors, the cosine similarity is 0 or -1, while the sum
remains 0.
As explained in Section 5, this attack is most effective
if ζ is only applied to features of type (3): those which are
not important for the model or the attack. This increases
sybil dissimilarity and does not adversely impact the
attack.
This attack is mitigated by filtering for indicative
features in the model. Instead of looking at the cosine sim-
ilarity between updates across all features in the model,
we look at a weighted cosine similarity based on feature
importance.
To evaluate the importance of this mechanism to the
poisoning attack, we execute the intelligent noise attack
described above on MNIST, which contains several irrel-
evant features (the large black regions) in each example:
a pair of sybils send v1 and v2 with intelligent noise ζ.
We then vary the proportion of model parameters that are
defined as indicative from 0.001 (8 features on MNIST)
to 1 (all features).
Figure 8 shows the attack rate and the training accu-
racy for varying proportions of indicative features. We first
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Figure 8. The performance of the optimal noisy attack on MNIST with
varying indicative feature ratio.
observe that when using all of the features for similarity
(far right), the poisoning attack is successful.
Once the proportion of indicative features decreases
below 0.1 (10%), the dissimilarity caused by the intel-
ligent noise is removed from the cosine similarity and
the poisoning vector dominates the similarity, causing the
intelligent noise strategy to fail with an attack rate of near
0. We also observe that if the proportion of indicative
features is too low (0.01), the training accuracy also begins
to suffer. When considering such a low number of features,
honest clients appear to collude as well, causing false
positives.
We also evaluated the soft feature weighing mech-
anism, which weighs each contribution proportionally
based on the model parameter itself. The results of the
soft weighting method on the same intelligent MNIST
poisoning attack are also shown in Figure 8. For both the
attack rate and training accuracy, the performance of the
soft mechanism is comparable to the optimal hard filtering
mechanism.
Adaptive updates method. We devised another optimal
attack against FoolsGold that manipulates its memory
component. If an adversary knows that FoolsGold employs
cosine similarity on the update history, and is able to lo-
cally compute the pairwise cosine similarity among sybils,
they can bookkeep this information and decide to send
poisoned updates only when their similarity is sufficiently
low (Algorithm 2). This algorithm uses a parameter M ,
representing the inter-sybil cosine similarity threshold.
When M is low, sybils are less likely to be detected
by FoolsGold as they will send their updates less often;
however, this will also lower the influence each sybil has
on the global model.
An adversary could generate an exceedingly large
number of sybils for a successful attack, but given that
the adversary is uncertain about the influence needed
to overpower the honest clients, this becomes a difficult
trade-off to navigate for an optimal attack.
To demonstrate this, the intelligent noise attack above
is executed by 2 sybils on MNIST, with FoolsGold using
the soft weighing of features in its cosine similarity (the
optimal defense for MNIST against the intelligent noise
attack). Figure 9 shows the relationship between M and
the resulting expected ratio of sybils needed to match the
influence for each honest opposing client.
For instance, if we observed that the sybils only sent
poisoning gradients 25% of the time, they would need
4 sybils. Given a prescribed similarity threshold M , the
Data: Desired ∆t from all sybils at iteration t,
similarity threshold M
1 for iteration t do
2 for All sybils i do
// Compute local history
3 Let Hi be the aggregate historical vector∑T
t=1 ∆i,t
// Feature Importance and similarity
4 Let St be the set of indicative features at
iteration t (if known)
5 for All other sybils j do
6 Let csij be the St-weighted cosine
similarity between Hi and Hj
7
8 end
9 end
10 for All sybils i do
// Decision using row-wise maximum
11 if maxj(csi) > M then
12 Send intelligent noise vector ζ
13 end
14 else
15 Send ∆t to server
16 end
17 end
18 end
Algorithm 2: Adaptive attack on FoolsGold.
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Figure 9. Relationship between similarity threshold and expected ratio
of sybils per honest opposing client for the adaptive attack on FoolsGold
(Alg. 9) with 2 sybils on MNIST.
values shown are the expected number of sybils required
for the optimal attack. The attack is optimal because using
less sybils does not provide enough influence to poison the
model, while using more sybils is inefficient.
This is shown on Figure 9 by the three shaded regions:
in the green region to the right (M > 0.27), the threshold
is too high and any poisoning attack is detected and
removed. In the blue region on the bottom left, the attack
is not detected, but there is an insufficient number of sybils
to overpower the honest opposing clients. Lastly, in the top
left red region, the attack succeeds, potentially with more
sybils than required.
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With a sufficiently large number of sybils and appro-
priately low threshold, attackers can subvert our current
defense for our observed datasets. Finding the appropriate
threshold is challenging as it is dependent on many other
factors: the number of honest clients in the system, the
proportion of indicative features considered by FoolsGold,
and the distribution of data.
Furthermore, this attack requires a higher proportion
of sybils than the baseline poisoning attack on federated
learning. For example, when M is set to 0.01, an attacker
would require a minimum of 10 sybils per opposing client
to poison the model, whereas in federated learning, they
would only need to exceed the number of opposing clients.
The exact number of sybils required to successfully poison
the model is unknown to attackers without knowledge of
the number of honest clients and their honest training data.
6.5. Effects of design elements
Each of the three main design elements (history, par-
doning and logit) described in Section 4 addresses specific
challenges. In the following experiments we disabled one
of the three components and recorded the training error,
attack rate, and target class error of the resulting model.
History. The two subversion strategies in the previous
section increase the variance of updates in each iteration.
The increased variance in the updates sent by sybils cause
the cosine similarities at each iteration to be an inaccurate
approximation of a client’s sybil likelihood. Our design
uses history to address this issue, and we evaluate it
by comparing the performance of FoolsGold with and
without history using an A-5 MNIST attack with 80%
poisoned data and batch size of 1 (two factors which were
previously shown to have a high variance).
Pardoning. We claim that honest client updates may be
similar to the updates of sybils, especially if the honest
client owns the data for the targeted class. To evaluate
the necessity and efficacy of our pardoning system, we
compare the performance of FoolsGold on KDDCup with
the A-AllOnOne attack with and without pardoning.
Logit. An important motivation for using the logit func-
tion is that adversaries can arbitrarily increase the number
of sybils to mitigate any non-zero weighting of their
updates. We evaluate the performance of FoolsGold with
and without the logit function for the A-99 MNIST attack.
Figure 10 shows the overall training error, sybil attack
rate, and target class error for the six different evaluations.
The attack rate for the A-AllOnOne KDDCup attack is the
average attack rate for the 5 sets of sybils.
Overall, the results align with our claims. Comparing
the A-5 MNIST case with and without history, we find
that history successfully mitigates attacks that otherwise
would pass through in the no-history system. Comparing
the results of the A-AllOnOne KDDCup attack, we find
that, without pardoning, the training error and target class
error increase while the attack rate was negligible for both
cases, indicating a high rate of false positives for the target
class. Finally, comparing the results for the A-99 MNIST
attack, without the logit function, the adversary was able
to mount a successful attack by overwhelming FoolsGold
with sybils, showing that the logit function is necessary
to prevent this attack.
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Figure 11. Running time overhead of FoolsGold as compared to Feder-
ated Learning (baseline of 1), for MNIST (on a CPU) and VGGFace2
(on a GPU).
6.6. FoolsGold performance overhead
We evaluate the runtime overhead incurred by aug-
menting a federated learning system with FoolsGold. We
run the system with and without FoolsGold with 10 – 50
clients by training an MNIST classifier on a commodity
CPU and a VGGFace2 deep learning model on a Titan V
CPU.
Figure 11 plots the relative slowdown added by Fools-
Gold for CPU and GPU based workloads. On a CPU, the
most expensive part of the FoolsGold algorithm is comput-
ing the pairwise cosine similarity. Our Python prototype
is not optimized and there are known optimizations to im-
prove the speed of computing angular distance at scale [2].
When training a deep learning model on a GPU, the cost
of training is high enough that the relative slowdown from
FoolsGold is negligible. We profiled micro-benchmarks
for the total time taken to execute the FoolsGold algorithm
and found that it took less than 1.5 seconds, even with 50
clients.
7. Limitations
Combating a single client adversary. FoolsGold is de-
signed to counter sybil-based attacks and our results in
Figure 5 indicate that FoolsGold is not successful at
mitigating attacks mounted by a single poisoning client.
However, we note that a single malicious actor could
be detected and removed by Multi-Krum [10]. Though
Multi-Krum is not designed for and does poorly in the
non-IID setting, we performed an experiment in which
FoolsGold was augmented with a properly parameterized
Multi-Krum solution, with f = 1.
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Figure 12. The performance of Multi-Krum with FoolsGold when com-
bating the optimal strawman attack on MNIST.
We consider an ideal strawman attack in which a
single adversarial client sends the vector to the poisoning
objective at each iteration. This attack does not require
sybils and can therefore bypass FoolsGold. Figure 12
shows the training accuracy and the attack rate for Fools-
Gold, Multi-Krum, and the two systems combined when
facing a concurrent A-5 and the ideal strawman attacks.
When Multi-Krum uses f = 1 and FoolsGold is en-
abled, we see that Multi-Krum and FoolsGold do not inter-
fere with each other. The Multi-Krum algorithm prevents
the strawman attack, and FoolsGold prevents the sybil
attack. Independently, these two systems fail to defend
both attacks concurrently, either by failing to detect the
ideal strawman attack (against FoolsGold) or by allowing
the sybils to overpower the system (against Multi-Krum).
FoolsGold is specifically designed for handling poi-
soning attacks from a group of sybils: we believe current
state of the art is better suited to mitigate attacks from
single actors.
Improving FoolsGold against informed attacks. In Fig-
ure 9, we observe that FoolsGold can be subverted by a
knowledgeable adversary with many sybils. We believe
that non-determinism may further help to improve Fools-
Gold. For example, by using a weighted random subset
of gradients in the history mechanism or by measuring
similarity across random subsets of client contributions.
With more randomness, it is more difficult for intelligent
adversaries to use knowledge about FoolsGold’s design to
their advantage.
Another solution is to use a better similarity met-
ric. This includes strategies from prior work such as
incorporating graph-based similarity [41], using auxiliary
information from a client dataset [39], or mandating a
minimum similarity score to reject anomalous contribu-
tions. While more informed, these solutions also require
more assumptions about the nature of the attack.
8. Related work
We reviewed Multi-Krum [10] as the state of the art
defense against poisoning in federated learning. Here we
review the broader literature on secure ML, sybils, and
poisoning.
Secure ML. Another approach to mitigating sybils in
federated learning is to make the overall system more
secure. Trusted execution environments, such as SGX are
an alternative solution [33]. However, we note that sybil-
based poisoning can be performed at the data input level,
which is not secured by SGX. Even in a secure enclave
running trusted code, a poisoning attack can be performed
through malicious data. FoolsGold can be added to sys-
tems based on SGX to prevent sybil attacks.
Other solutions employ data provenance to prevent
poisoning attacks [5] by segmenting, identifying, and
removing training data from the model that is likely
malicious. This solution requires extra assumptions about
how training data is collected and in federated learning,
where many clients supply data from a variety of sources,
this assumption is unrealistic.
Sybil defenses. One way to mitigate sybils is to use proof
of work [3], in which a client must solve a computation-
ally expensive problem (that is easy to check) to contribute
to the system. Recent alternatives have explored the use
of proof of stake [19], which weighs clients by the value
of their stake in the system.
Some approach actively detect and remove sybils us-
ing auxiliary information, such as an underlying social
network [38], or detect and reject malicious behavior [39],
[40]. Many sybil detection strategies map the interactions
between clients into a weighted graph and use sybil de-
fenses from social networks [41] as a reduction. How-
ever, federated learning limits the amount of information
exposed to the central service, and these defenses may
rely on privacy-compromising information. By contrast,
FoolsGold does not use any auxiliary information outside
of the learning process.
Other ML poisoning defenses. Another poisoning de-
fense involves bagging classifiers [8] to mitigate the ef-
fects of outliers in the system. These defenses are effective
in scenarios where the dataset is centralized, but are com-
plex to apply in a federated learning setting, where access
to the data is prohibited. This algorithm also assumes
control of the gradient computation during training.
AUROR [36] is a defense designed for the multi-
party ML setting. It defines indicative features to be
the most important model features, and a distribution of
modifications to them is collected and fed to a clustering
algorithm. Contributions from small clusters that exceed a
threshold distance are removed. This clustering assumes
that the majority of updates to that feature come from
honest clients for all indicative features. Unlike AUROR,
FoolsGold assumes the presence of sybils and uses gradi-
ent similarity to detect anomalous clients.
9. Conclusion
The decentralization of ML is driven by growing
privacy and scalability challenges. Federated learning is
a state of the art proposal adopted in production [27].
However, such decentralization opens the door for ma-
licious clients to participate in training. We considered
the problem of poisoning attacks by sybils to achieve
a poisoning objective. We show that existing defenses
to such attacks are ineffective and propose FoolsGold, a
defense that uses client contribution similarity.
Our results indicate that FoolsGold can mitigate a
variety of attack types and is effective even when sybils
overwhelm honest users. We also considered advanced
attack types in which sybils mix poisoned data with honest
data, add intelligent noise to their updates, and adaptively
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rate limit their poisoned updates to avoid detection. Across
all scenarios, our defense is able to outperform prior work.
FoolsGold minimally changes the federated learning
algorithm, relies on standard techniques such as cosine
similarity, and does not require prior knowledge of the
expected number of sybils. We hope that our work inspires
further research on defenses that are co-designed with the
underlying learning procedure.
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Appendix A: Convergence analysis
Theorem: Given the process in Algorithm 1, the
convergence rate of the participants (malicious and
honest) is O( 1T 2 ) over T iterations.
Proof of theorem: We know from the convergence anal-
ysis of SGD [31] that for a constant learning rate, we
achieve a O( 1T 2 ) convergence rate.
Let M be the set of malicious clients in the system
and G be the set of honest clients in the system. Assume
that the adapted learning rates provided at each iteration
αi are provided by a function h(i, t), where i is the client
index and t is the current training iteration. As long as
h(i, t) does not modify the local learning rate of the
honest clients and removes the contributions of sybils, the
convergence analysis of SGD applies as if the training was
performed with the honest clients’ data.
∀i ∈M,h(i, t)→ 0 (cond1)
∀i ∈ G, h(i, t)→ 1 (cond2)
We will show that, under certain assumptions, FoolsGold
satisfies both conditions of h(i, t). We prove each
condition separately.
Condition 1: Let vi be the ideal gradient for any given
client i from the initial shared global model w0, that is:
w0 + vi = w
∗
i where w
∗
i is the optimal model relative to
any client i’s local training data. Since we have defined
all sybils to have the same poisoning goal, all sybils will
have the same ideal gradient, which we define to be vm.
As the number of iterations in FoolsGold increases,
the historical gradient Hi,t for each sybil approaches vm,
with error from the honest client contributions :
∀i ∈M : lim
t→∞Hi,t = vm + 
Since the historical update tends to the same vector for all
sybils, the expected pairwise similarity of these updates
will increase as the learning process continues. As long as
the resulting similarity, including the effect of pardoning
between sybils, is below βm, FoolsGold will adapt the
learning rate to 0, satisfying (cond1).
βm is the point at which the logit function is below 0
and is a function of the confidence parameter κ:
βm ≥ 1− e
−0.5κ
1 + e−0.5κ
Condition 2: Regarding the ideal gradients of honest
clients, we assume that the maximum pairwise cosine
similarity between the ideal gradient of honest clients is
βg. As long as βg is sufficiently low such that FoolsGold
assigns a learning rate adaptation of 1 for all honest
clients, the second condition of h(i, t) is met. βg is the
point at which the logit function is greater than 1 and is
also a function of the confidence parameter κ:
βg ≤ 1− e
0.5κ
1 + e0.5κ
If the above condition holds, FoolsGold will classify these
clients to be honest and will not modify their learning
rates. This maintains the constant learning rate and satis-
fies (cond2).
Appendix B: Additional Evaluations
Comparison to RONI. A Reject on Negative Influence
(RONI) defense [6] counters ML poisoning attacks. When
evaluating a set of suspicious training examples, this de-
fense trains two models: one model using a trusted dataset,
and another model using the union of the trusted and
suspicious data. If the performance of the model degrades
the performance beyond a specified threshold, the data is
rejected.
RONI has not been applied to federated learning be-
fore. To extend RONI to a federated learning setting, the
server can capture the influence of a single update, rather
than an entire dataset. RONI is ineffective in this setting
because, at any given iteration, an honest gradient may
update the model in an incorrect direction, resulting in
a drop in validation accuracy. This is confounded by the
problem that clients may have data that is not accurately
modeled by the RONI validation set. For example, we
can see in Table 1 that the prediction accuracy across the
other nine digits only dropped slightly when executing a
poisoning attack in a non-IID setting. Depending on the
RONI threshold, this poisoning attack may go undetected.
We show that using RONI with a validation dataset
that contains a uniform distribution of data, is insufficient
in countering sybil-based poisoning in a non-IID setting.
We train an MNIST classifier and use a 10,000 ex-
ample IID RONI validation set. We perform an A-5 1-7
attack on the system and log the total RONI validation
score across all 15 clients (10 honest and 5 sybils) for
3,000 iterations. Figure 13 shows the total sum of the
RONI score across all iterations (the 5 right-most clients
in the Figure are sybils). A RONI score below 0 indicates
rejection. Figure 13 shows that all clients except the honest
client with the digit 1 had received a negative score in
every iteration.
In the non-IID setting, clients send updates that do
not represent an update from the global data distribution.
Validating individual updates from a single client in such
a fashion produces false positives because the aggregator
holds a validation set that contains uniform samples, and
RONI flags each of their updates as malicious for doing
poorly on the validation set.
Without prior knowledge of the details of a potential
attack, RONI is unable to distinguish between updates
coming from sybils and updates coming from honest non-
IID clients.
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Figure 13. The final sum of the RONI validation scores for the A-5
attack executed on federated learning: RONI is unable to distinguish the
malicious clients (5 rightmost) from most of the honest ones (the first
10).
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Figure 14. The attack rates for the A-5 attack executed for all combi-
nations: attempting to mis-label a true (source) 0-9 class to a different
(target) 0-9 class.
Attack generalization. In this work, we have used the 1-
7 attack on MNIST as our running example. However, the
attacker could be more successful in attacking a different
source and target class. We evaluate FoolsGold’s ability
to generalize to other targeted poisoning attacks against
MNIST (i.e., all other possible source and target MNIST
labels) For each possible source-target combination, we
execute the A-5 attack scenario against FoolsGold.
Figure 14 shows the resulting attack rate for our de-
fense across all permutations of the A-5 MNIST poisoning
attacks.
The highest attack rate observed across all source-
target combinations is 0.02, indicating that FoolsGold gen-
eralizes to other class-based poisoning attacks in MNIST.
Backdoor attacks. To demonstrate the applicability of
FoolsGold towards backdoor sybil attacks, we repeat the
baseline evaluation against the single pixel backdoor at-
tack [20]. To perform this attack, a random subset of the
MNIST training data is marked with a white pixel in the
bottom-right corner of the image, and labelled as a 7. A
successful backdoor attack results in a model where all
images with the backdoor inserted (a white bottom-right
pixel) would be predicted as 7s, regardless of the other
information in the image.
The backdoor attack becomes stronger when a higher
proportion of the training data is poisoned [20]; we view
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Figure 15. Backdoor attack rate for varying number of sybils, for
federated learning (Baseline), Multi-Krum, and FoolsGold.
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Figure 16. Sybils cannot subvert FoolsGold by including a proportion
of different honest or attack data.
this as identical to increasing the number of sybils in the
system, who all possess a random subset of the original
training data with the backdoor inserted. The single pixel
backdoor was applied with an increasing number of poi-
soners (from 0 to 9), against a system with FoolsGold,
Multi-Krum or federated learning. In this experiment,
Multi-Krum was also configured such that the parameter
f was equal to the number of sybils in the system.
The results of the sybil-based backdoor attack are
shown in Figure 15. FoolsGold is also effective in de-
fending against the backdoor attack from a large number
of sybils, for FEDSGD and FEDAVG.
Since the sybils are all performing the same attack, in
which all classes are being backdoored to the same class,
the similarities between these updates will be higher than
the similarities between honest clients.
As in the label-flipping evaluation, there was a high
degree of false positives in FoolsGold when being attacked
by only one backdooring client. While the attack rate was
0, the resulting test accuracy was below 80% (due to low
prediction rate of 7s).
Resilience to mixed data. Attackers may attempt to
subvert our design by creating a dataset with a mixture
of honest and poisoned data. This provides an opportu-
nity for sybils to appear honest, as they are less similar
when executing SGD. Note that in this case the attacker
purposefully mitigates their attack by labeling a proportion
of the poisoned dataset correctly.
To evaluate this attack, we created datasets with 20%,
40%, 60% and 80% poisoned data for an MNIST 1-7
attack, and the remaining proportion of the data with hon-
estly labeled data. We also perform a second experiment
in which the attacker mixes their data with poisoned data
for a second 4-9 attack, effectively performing a mixture
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Figure 17. The performance of the A-5 attack on all datasets with
increasing batch size.
of two targeted poisoning datasets simultaneously. Both
attacks are mounted using the A-5 strategy.
Figure 16 plots the attack rate against the proportion
of mixing. This attack was performed with KDDCup and
Amazon datasets, for which all attack rates are 0; we
omit these results. We observe that FoolsGold is robust to
this strategy: the amount of data mixing does not impact
FoolsGold’s ability to mitigate sybils, when choosing any
proportion between 20% and 80%, the maximum average
attack rate observed is 0.003.
At any individual iteration, sybils are more likely
to appear as honest clients. However, as the number of
iterations increases, the average will tend to the same
objective, which FoolsGold is able to detect through its
use of history. The effect of this mechanism is explored
more in Section 6.5.
Resilience to different batch sizes. Another factor that
impacts FoolsGold’s effectiveness is the client batch size.
Given that variance in SGD decreases with more data
points, we expect FoolsGold to perform worse with
smaller batch sizes.
To evaluate different batch sizes, we performed A-5
attacks on all three datasets. In each case, all clients and
sybils perform SGD with the same batch size for values of
1, 5, 10, 20, 50, and 100. Since no Amazon data partition
contains over 50 examples, we do not evaluate Amazon
with batch sizes of 50 and 100.
Figure 17 shows the attack rate as the batch size
increases. It shows that FoolsGold is resilient to the batch
size for A-5 attacks performed on MNIST and KDDCup,
achieving an attack rate at or near 0.
The only instance in which performance of the system
suffered was for the A-5 Amazon attack with the batch
size set to 1; the resulting attack rate was 4.76%. This
is due to the curse of dimensionality: there is a higher
variance in the similarities between updates when the
dimension size is large (10,000). This variance is maximal
when the batch size is lowest.
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